And He Played with a Scalpel

In a previous article we likened the Mama Sapano operation to that of a “surgical operation”, a medical term involving an incision using special instruments performed by a well-trained doctor in order to repair damage or arrest disease in a living body. We also likened the SAF (Special Action Force) to the scalpel, a sharp instrument that can make precise and neat cuts where they are needed in order to remove or cure the sick part of the patient without unnecessarily tearing his healthy and unaffected flesh. This instrument made of the best metal and created for a special purpose has to be wielded in the hands of an experienced surgeon. Further we said that in the hands of a monkey, the scalpel can do more damage and can kill the patient instead.

Accordingly, there were several “errors” that were committed as gleaned from the various investigations, inquiries and discussions on the infamous “Operation Exodus” that claimed the lives of 44 members of an elite unit of the PNP. 

Normally, an operation involving a high level target such as that of international terrorist, Zulkifli Bin Hir alyas “Marwan” involves three levels of plans, decisions and actions – strategic, operational and tactical. The strategic level is reserved only for the Chief Executive with the help of his cabinet and advisers. Strategic activities are those that have socio-cultural, economic, political, diplomatic and military dimensions. These different dimensions always affect one another. Hence, they are wider in scope and have long range effects or impacts on the wellbeing and stability of the nation. These activities directly or indirectly support our national aims and objectives. 

The decision to neutralize Marwan at that point in time indeed was a strategic one. While the direct action was basically military or police in nature, it had some socio-cultural, political, diplomatic, and economic dynamics. It affects some national and international concerns and answer some important questions such as: “Will it bolster our claim that the Philippines strongly supports the war against international terrorism and will it satisfy the expectations of our allies (such as the US)?”; “Will it contribute to the peace and order condition in Mindanao and hasten foreign and local investments in the area?”; and “How will it affect our fragile peace initiatives with the MILF and future ones with other groups or organizations that threaten the security of our country?”, among others. 

The issue of coordinating with the MILF is definitely a strategic one (and could not be blamed on P/Dir Getulio Napeñas who is only on the tactical level). Aside from the other local non-military concerns as an effect of the operations, it may also have some diplomatic repercussions. Other countries, such as Malaysia that brokered the peace efforts, may feel that such surreptitious action in MILF “territory” would create distrust between the government and the MILF and therefore runs counter to the confidence building measures that Malaysia was so interested about. On the other hand, coordinating (asking permission is perhaps the proper term) with the MILF will project an image that the Philippines does not have sovereignty in these areas and may be used as a basis for the MILF to seek for a “belligerency” status from an international body.

The Secretaries of the DILG and DND are part of the strategic group being the alter egos and chief advisers of the President on peace and order matters. They also serve as the bridge between the strategic and operational levels and hence are also part of the operational side of the undertaking. Yet they were not consulted nor asked to contribute in the planning of the operation. The suspended PNP Chief is obviously not a part of the strategic group. However, if he was not suspended, he may be called upon to give operational inputs needed for strategic planning.

The operational level supports the strategic initiative and is meant to “operationalize” the strategic decision. The operational plans, decisions and actions conform to that of the strategic. Although these may be in general terms, they give more substance and provide additional guidelines. The Secretaries of DILG and the DND; the Chief, PNP his major units; and the Chief of Staff, AFP and his major units are part of the operational group. The plans, decisions and actions in this level determine how the operation may be conducted; which units of the AFP and the PNP or civilian agencies may be involved; and the support systems that may be necessary to perform them. They also make the necessary coordination with other national agencies of government such as the DSWD and the DOH. 

The lowest level in the hierarchy is the tactical side. This is where P/Director Getulio Napeñas comes in. His unit, the SAF, was tasked to accomplish the job and to perform the actual operations in accordance with the plan dictated from the top. However, situations vary and are sometimes even totally different on the ground than what was in the plan. As such, the tactical commander may implement situation dictated actions; or improvise those that were earlier planned and anticipated; or even abort the mission. In extreme situations, the ground commander even violates operational guidelines if in his wisdom this is necessary to accomplish the mission or ensure the safety of his men. A good tactical commander therefore is one who knows how to balance his two primary duties – to accomplish the mission and to look after the welfare of his men. Being the man on the ground, he is the best person to know the most effective course of action to take if it is not specifically mentioned in the plan. However, he may be forced to comply with a strategic directive even it defies all operational and tactical sanity. 

Failures or successes are always determined at the end of a mission. If it succeeds, everybody claims that it was his or was a part of it. If it fails, nobody acknowledges his fault. Sadly, it is always the tactical commander that is blamed for blunders on the ground even if he just followed the “beautiful” plan laid out on a piece of paper by swivel chair commanders who have never had any experience in the field. Seasoned and wise leaders spend more time in the planning of important undertakings. He makes sure that the right persons are consulted; the necessary data are gathered and meticulously evaluated and the preliminary and supporting activities are performed before the main and more important operation is undertaken. Most often, a good plan ensures the success of a mission. 

Napeñas may have committed some tactical errors which are unexplainable being a seasoned combat officer. He did not abort the mission when his blocking force failed to occupy its designated position on time. His troops tarried on in the area, amongst a corn field (a tactically unsafe position) when they could have hastily withdrawn after killing Marwan. He did not (or failed to) employ as reinforcement his more than 300 elite forces located at the nearby highway. It is hard to understand why these basic “errors” were committed knowing him to be an experienced SAF operator. One may only speculate that he was made to do these tactically unsound decisions for more “strategic” intentions.

A monkey played with a scalpel and he would not admit it even if blood showed in his hands.

Casting our own shadows

My sons were but young boys when, as a captain, I started to enjoy the amenities  of a "senior" officer having just been designated as the Secretary to the Area Command Staff of the Visayas Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines.  One of these amenities, not normally accorded to other officers of the same rank or even higher, was a “staff car”.  Actually, it was just a Kennedy type jeep but in those days, it was already a big thing.  We had very few vehicles then and only the top three people in the organization and the principal staff had them

With my new assignment, my children now get the privilege of riding on a motor vehicle.  They love to ride that jeep each time they are in camp for their regular visits.  It made them feel great because back home, riding with their grandfather on his old bicycle was the most that they could get. Each time that my sons join me in my “staff car”, they would insist to sit with me in the front.  It is not only more comfortable there but the boys had other reasons why they prefer that seat.  They were fascinated with what they can see from that vantage position.  They wanted to observe closely the routine type of military courtesy that I get – the military salute. 

It is customary that when a soldier salutes a senior officer, the latter has to acknowledge it by also rendering a similar courtesy.  (Although in some cases when it is impractical or inconvenient to return the salute, a simple nod may do.)  My sons would then imagine that they were the ones being saluted at.  Hence, whoever amongst them was the first one to get my cap and wear it; he would have the privilege of acknowledging the soldier with the snappiest salute that he could muster with his infirm hand.  Being saluted and saluting the soldiers back never fail to make my boys beam with pride.

Children always get to enjoy the extension of the privileges, the amenities and the esteem that were meant for their parents by virtue of their positions in their respective organizations or spheres of influence.   While roaming inside camp, my kids were always treated nicely or given preferential attention by the soldiers even if sometimes they become mischievous or even discourteous.  Often, they receive small gifts or get invited to partake of meals or snacks by “strangers” whom they learn later on were my friends. 

As my children grew older, I gradually explained to them the phenomenon of reflected friendship, respect and esteem that they get from my friends.  I told them that these things are not forever.  A time will come that they will have to stand by themselves and cast their own shadows.  Later, people will treat and interact with them based on their own merits and not on the status or the accomplishments of their parents.

I have two (2) sons that followed my footsteps as a soldier.  When they were young, they were simply known as the sons of Captain Cabales (later on as the sons of Major then Colonel Cabales, as I rose up the promotional ladder).  Now they are their own persons no longer dependent on whatever influences I may still have as a retired soldier.  People know them as Major Alex Nikolai Cabales and 1Lt Alex Andre Cabales, both PMA graduates and maybe future generals.  Now, they only need their personal credentials when they introduce themselves.  The level of respect and esteem that they get (from their seniors, peers and subordinates) is based on their own capabilities and potentials.  They may also receive amenities and special privileges, sometimes even better than the one’s I got when I was their age and rank, but surely these are direct rewards of their commendable performances as officers.  Sometimes though, they are asked of our relationship by some people who once worked with me.  Perhaps then that would only be the time that it may be necessary for them to say that I am their father.  This additional information, however, can no longer alter a bit the strength of their reputations as professional military officers.   

Today, we have some people who run for public position who do not have their own credentials and haven’t had the opportunity of casting their own shadows.  The funny thing is that they believe that they deserve to win because their father or mother; or even a relative or a namesake was once a great achiever!   Funnier still is that the electorate will still vote for them with nothing else to show but this “talent” of being a son, a daughter or a relative of a great man.

Mama Sapano, A Surgical Operation

In the early phase of the inquiries involving the Mama Sapano debacle, one senior PNP officer commented that the SAF (Special Action Force) operation against international terrorist, Zulkifli Bin Hir alyas “Marwan” was a “surgical operation” of sorts. Few people might have picked up the term that he used as he didn't even bother to explain it at all.


“Surgical operation” is a medical term involving an incision using special instruments performed by a well-trained doctor in order to repair damage or arrest disease in a living body. As a general rule, it involves the cutting of a patient's tissues or closure of a previously sustained wound. It is an invasive procedure - one that penetrates or breaks the skin or enters a body cavity.


Marwan was a high value target who has for several years evaded the normal “search and destroy” type of military or police operations. He has lived amongst the MILF and BIFF communities since 2003 and several attempts to capture him failed for various reasons. Many say that he was being coddled (to say it mildly) by the MILF with whom the Philippine government is forging a peace agreement. Hence, there was a need to conduct a “surgical operation”, one that requires invasive actions. This kind of operation which is always characterized by surprise; lethal and precise execution; and timely and speedy conduct of the operations, was meant to be isolated from the provisions of the peace agreement being a legitimate law enforcement function.


Most of the previous operations against Marwan failed mainly because he was forewarned thus allowing him to evade the military or police forces. Surprise therefore is a key element to the success of the mission. The enemy should not know of your plan so that he cannot prepare accordingly. Even friendly forces or agencies may be left in the dark in order to avoid information leaks. This explains why the SAF did not inform the AFP of the impending operations because their participation was felt to be unnecessary at that time. The application of the “need to know” principle on the other agencies and the MILF as well was meant for the same reason. Foremost, however, was to deny Marwan with the usual mass base support from the community around him. In the case of the Mama Sapano operations, the SAF surprised Marwan and his security personnel and they were able to get him.


Just like in a medical surgical operation, the SAF had advanced information of the target, its operational environment and other conditions or factors that may affect his courses of action. Thus the act of neutralizing Marwan was very deliberate, lethal and executed with precision. They were able to contain the action to a small and specific area without disturbing the nearby villages at first. However, they tarried in the vicinity after accomplishing their mission which should not have been the case. That perhaps was a tactical error of judgement.


The swiftness in which Marwan was neutralized may have been in accordance with the SAF time table. The succeeding sequence of actions after completing their mission, however, was not. Ideally, they could have vacated the area as fast as they came in. And before the “enemy’ forces became aware of their invasive action, they would have long been gone. Yet, we learned that the assaulting and the blocking elements of the SAF did not vacate the area immediately after completing their mission. They tarried and even had breakfast (of chocolates as reported) in the vicinity of the action. This allowed the MILF and the BIFF to react and the rest was history.


There were three errors that I have seen that may have been forced on the SAF perhaps much against their tactical judgments. First, the SAF assaulting element proceeded with the operations even if their blocking forces were not yet in their designated areas. This condition makes them vulnerable to enemy maneuvers and counter attacks. Normally, that condition would have been a reason to abort the operation but they did not. Were they told to go ahead despite this? Why was there an urgency to complete the mission on that specific time frame? Was it part of an unfolding greater political scenario?


The second possible error was when they lingered on in the area near the initial encounter site inside a corn field when their tactical doctrine tells them it was an unsafe position? Where they told to stay put to act as a security force for the arrival of an important personality? Was the corn field meant to be a helipad?


The third was about the role of the more than 300 SAF personnel near the highway some 3-4 kilometers away. Why didn't they reinforce their beleaguered comrades when they learned that they were outmaneuvered and massacred like chicken? Were they really meant to be the reserve force? Why so big a “reserve” force when military doctrine says that the main force (assaulting) should have priority of forces, followed by the supporting/blocking force and the reserve last?


Normally, the reserve force is less than or at most equal to the main effort. In this case, the main force was only less than 40 personnel and the blocking force about the same number. Were they ordered not reinforce in order not to escalate the hostilities and “preserve” the government peace initiatives? Were the 300 SAF elements who were not engaged prepositioned as security forces in anticipation of the arrival of a VIP in the area?


We really do not know the answers as to why the SAF committed these blunders. All that we can do is to speculate.


The SAF is like the scalpel, a sharp instrument that can make precise and neat cuts where they are needed in order to remove or cure the sick part of the patient without unnecessarily tearing his healthy and unaffected flesh. This instrument made of the best metal and created for a special purpose has to be wielded by an experienced surgeon. In the hands of a monkey, the scalpel can do more damage and can kill the patient instead.